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Jared Burtner* 
A Catalyst for Change: Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. 
Committee, ERISA, and the Absence of a Uniform 
Loss Causation Standard 
In its August 4, 2014 decision in Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Committee, the 
Federal Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, by a two-to-one majority, issued 
two rulings significantly impacting ERISA litigation in its jurisdiction.1 First, the 
Tatum Court ruled that a breach of the duty of procedural prudence imposed on 
retirement account fiduciaries by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (“ERISA”) shifts the burden of production from the plaintiff to the defendant 
fiduciary to show that the imprudent behavior did not cause loss to the retirement 
plan in question.2 Second, the Tatum Court ruled that the standard for evaluating 
whether the fiduciary’s breach of prudence caused loss to the plan is whether a 
reasonably prudent fiduciary would have made the same decision.3 At the time, the 
United States Supreme Court had yet to weigh-in on either issue, making Tatum a 
prime catalyst for uniformity in an area of ERISA law either devoid of helpful 
precedent or marked by disagreement among the federal circuit courts of appeals.4 
While the Supreme Court denied certiorari to RJR Pension Inv. Committee on June 
29, 2015,5 several substantive problems with the Tatum rules suggest that the issues 
addressed by the Tatum Court are anything but conclusively resolved and could see 
intervention by the Supreme Court in a future case.6 
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 1. See generally Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 761 F.3d 346 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 
2887 (2015) (mem.). 
 2. Id. at 363. 
 3. Id. at 365. 
 4. See infra Part III. 
 5. See RJR Pension Inv. Comm. v. Tatum, 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015) (mem.). 
 6. See infra Part IV. 
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This note will present the relevant facts of the Tatum case,7 and then summarize 
the state of the law impacting the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals at the time of its 
decision.8 After explaining the reasoning of the Court in assigning the burden of 
proving loss causation to defendant fiduciaries and adopting a “would have” 
standard for evaluating loss causation,9 this note will elaborate on a couple of 
significant problems that suggest the Tatum rules could be subject to change in the 
future.10 First, despite having no Fourth Circuit precedent guiding the decision,11 the 
Tatum Court required the defendant to bear the burden of proof as to loss 
causation even though ERISA does not suggest departing from the default rule that 
this burden rests with the plaintiff.12 Second, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Fifth 
Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer that fiduciaries are not required to out-guess the 
market suggests that the Court would not support the Tatum Court’s “would have” 
standard for evaluating loss causation.13 
I.  THE CASE 
On February 25, 2013, the Federal District Court for the Middle District of North 
Carolina held that retirement plan fiduciaries at R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company 
(“RJR”) breached their duty of procedural prudence under ERISA by selling 
Nabisco stock from the RJR Tobacco Capital Investment Plan (“the Plan”) without 
undertaking a proper investigation.14 However, the District Court also found that 
RJR was not liable to Plan participants because a reasonable and prudent fiduciary 
could have made the same investment decision, even after a proper investigation.15 
The District Court’s decision came 11 years after Mr. Tatum filed a certified class 
action on behalf of all participants in the Plan whose individual retirement accounts 
included Nabisco Group Holdings (“NGH”) common stock and/or Nabisco 
(“NA”) common stock any time between June 14, 1999 and January 31, 2000.16 The 
presence of the two types of Nabisco stock in the Plan became an issue after 1999, 
 7. See infra Part I. 
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
 11. See Plasterers’ Local Union No. 96 Pension Plan v. Pepper, 663 F.3d 210, 218 (4th Cir. 2011) (finding 
that “while a failure to investigate is a breach of ERISA fiduciary duty under § 1104(a)(1)(B), causation of loss is 
not an axiomatic conclusion that flows from a breach of that duty,” but not adopting a standard by which to 
evaluate causation); id. at 220 (declining to determine whether burden of proving causation falls on the plaintiff 
or defendant fiduciary). 
 12. See infra Part IV.A. 
 13. 134 S. Ct. 2459, 2471 (2014).  See infra Part IV.B. 
 14. Tatum v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 926 F. Supp. 2d 648, 651 (M.D.N.C. 2013), aff’d in part, vacated 
in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 761 F.3d 346 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
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when RJR Nabisco’s tobacco products subsidiary, RJR Tobacco, spun-off from its 
food products subsidiary, Nabisco.17 
Corresponding to the spin-off, the original RJR Nabisco retirement plan was 
divided into separate plans for the respective employees of Nabisco and RJR 
Tobacco.18 Consequently, plan participants who had previously invested in the RJR 
Nabisco Holdings stock now held both NGH and RJR Tobacco Holdings stock.19 
The RJR Tobacco Plan, which was the subject of contention in the District Court 
case, opened on June 14, 1999, and was intended as a long-term retirement savings 
plan including capital appreciation and dividend income.20 
Once the spin-off was announced in March 2014, various employees—mostly 
from the human resources departments of RJR Nabisco Holdings and its two 
subsidiaries—held a series of meetings to determine, among other things, the future 
of the divided retirement plans.21 These working groups did not have authority 
under the original RJR Nabisco Plan documents nor the later, separate Nabisco and 
RJR Tobacco Plan documents to make decisions about any of the three plans.22 
Concerned with the high risk of having single, non-employer Nabisco stock in the 
RJR Tobacco Plan, and believing that such stock would violate ERISA’s 
diversification requirement,23 the working group decided to freeze all Nabisco stock 
in the RJR Tobacco accounts at the time of the spin-off.24 The working group also 
decided that the two Nabisco funds would be entirely eliminated six months after 
the spin-off, with an opportunity for participants to exit the two Nabisco funds any 
time before then.25 The RJR Tobacco Employee Benefits Commission (“EBC”) 
allegedly concurred with the decisions of the working group, but RJR did not 
provide evidence of a vote by the EBC in court.26 
Plan documents for the new R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company Capital 
Investment Plan froze Nabisco funds by amendment,27 and the planned divestment 
of the Nabisco funds was promulgated to Plan participants through an official 
letter.28 The working group that met in October 1999 to discuss the logistics of the 
divestment ultimately decided that the divestment must go forward because many 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 653. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See id. at 655. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (2012) (requiring fiduciaries to discharge duties by “diversifying the 
investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly 
prudent not to do so”). 
 24. See Tatum, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 656. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 657. 
 27. Id. at 657–58. 
 28. See id. at 657. 
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participants had already transferred out of the Nabisco funds at a loss based on the 
earlier Plan communications.29 The working group also expressed concern that 
unfreezing the funds and not divesting as planned would appear to participants as 
encouragement to invest in the Nabisco funds, which were still falling in value at 
the time.30 Group members worried that the Nabisco funds would never rebound, 
which also motivated divestment.31 The fourth quarter report from 1999, issued just 
prior to the rescheduled January 2000 divestment date, showed quarterly losses of 
7.7 percent for NA stock and losses of 27.3 percent for NGH stock.32 Analysts were 
generally divided as to whether Nabisco stocks would continue to fall, hold 
constant, or eventually gain.33 Since the June 1999 spin-off, NGH stock had fallen 60 
percent and NA stock had fallen 28 percent.34 Only two months later, a round of 
competitive bidding instigated by an unsolicited offer resulted in an infusion of $11 
billion in liquid funds.35 When that transaction closed on December 11, 2000, NGH 
stock had increased 247 percent and NA stock had increased 82 percent on their 
January 31, 2000 share prices.36 
On January 27, 2000, just before divestment, Mr. Tatum emailed fiduciaries 
requesting cancellation of the proposed sale because he stood to lose 60 percent of 
his 401k account.37 In a follow-up meeting, the same fiduciaries relayed that nobody 
could stop the divestment.38 After several further communications, Mr. Tatum 
claimed on May 1, 2001 that he should receive $30 for each NGH share instead of 
the $8 to $9 he received after the January 31, 2000 divestment.39 RJR denied the 
claim, citing that Mr. Tatum had the opportunity to individually sell the NGH 
funds any time before the divestment.40 
With no relief coming from RJR, Mr. Tatum filed suit, claiming RJR breached its 
fiduciary duties under ERISA by failing to conduct a proper investigation before 
divesting the Plan of the Nabisco funds.41 While the District Court found that RJR 
had acted imprudently, the Court also found that RJR’s procedural imprudence did 
not cause loss to the Plan, thereby exempting RJR from liability.42 Mr. Tatum 
 29. See id. at 661. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 662. 
 32. Id. at 665. 
 33. See id. at 662–63. 
 34. Id. at 666. 
 35. See id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 667. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 668. 
 40. See id. 
 41. See id. at 669. 
 42. See id. 
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subsequently appealed the District Court’s decision to the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.43 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Though in several earlier cases the Fourth Circuit had addressed whether an ERISA 
fiduciary had breached the duty of procedural prudence, the issue of loss causation 
had not factored into any of those decisions.44 The issues of assigning the burden of 
proof as to loss causation and evaluating whether procedural imprudence caused 
plan losses were both novel to the Fourth Circuit. Previously, the Fourth Circuit 
had only gone so far as to recognize that loss causation could prove a critical issue 
in future ERISA cases.45 Moreover, the United States Supreme Court had only 
indirectly addressed the issue of loss causation in ERISA litigation, and that 
occurred in a decision preceding Tatum by only several months.46 Thus, Tatum 
presented the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals an opportunity to pick a side in the 
circuit split developing over the loss causation issue.47 
A.  ERISA’s Duty of Procedural Prudence in the Fourth Circuit 
In the 2007 DiFelice v. U.S. Airways case, the Fourth Circuit found that U.S. Airways 
had exercised prudence in managing employee retirement funds even after Chapter 
11 Bankruptcy had eliminated all U.S. Airways stock from the funds without any 
distribution of money to plan participants.48 To reach this decision, the Fourth 
Circuit grappled with the issue of outlining the duty of procedural prudence in 
ERISA litigation.49 Looking to the ERISA statute, the DiFelice Court recognized the 
“requirement that fiduciaries act ‘with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under 
the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and 
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like 
character and with like aims.’”50 To determine whether a fiduciary has violated this 
duty, the Fourth Circuit found it must “examine the totality of the circumstances,” 
including “plan structure and aims, the disclosures made to participants regarding 
the general and specific risks associated with investment in company stock, and the 
nature and extent of challenges facing the company that would have an effect on 
 43. Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 761 F.3d 346, 351 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 44. See infra Part II.A. 
 45. See infra Part II.B. 
 46. See infra Part II.C. 
 47. See infra Part II.D. 
 48. See DiFelice v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d 410, 413–14 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 49. Id. at 419 (Appellant’s employees contended that “the company’s economic peril rendered its decision 
to offer the Company Fund to Plan participants a violation of its fiduciary duties to select and hold prudent 
investments and to monitor those investments prudently.”). 
 50. Id. at 422–23 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2012)). 
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stock price and viability.”51 A court must also determine whether the trustee 
engaged in a transaction only after employing “appropriate methods to investigate 
the merits of the investment and to structure the investment.”52 
Though the DiFelice Court determined procedural prudence by considering the 
totality of the circumstances,53 the Fourth Circuit has also recognized several actions 
that strongly indicate prudent decision-making by plan fiduciaries. The DiFelice 
Court found evidence of procedural prudence where the defendant fiduciary 
appointed an independent fiduciary to monitor company stock during a turbulent 
period.54 Though not specifically required by ERISA, the Fourth Circuit also found, 
in Plasterers v. Pepper, that a “generally recognized duty of a Plan fiduciary under 
subsection (B) includes that of investigating and reviewing investment options for 
an ERISA plan’s assets.”55 
Though a fiduciary’s adherence to its duty of procedural prudence may be 
determined by considering its actions and the relevant circumstances, the Fourth 
Circuit carefully noted in DiFelice that the prudence of a fiduciary’s actions cannot 
be measured by hindsight, “whether this hindsight would accrue to the fiduciary’s 
detriment or benefit.”56 Consequently, “the prudent person standard is not 
concerned with results,” but tests the fiduciary’s actions in light of the 
circumstances at the time of the challenged decision.57 Because the end result is 
irrelevant in finding a decision imprudent, a loss of monetary value in a fund is 
“neither necessary, nor sufficient, to demonstrate a violation of a fiduciary’s ERISA 
duties.”58 The DiFelice Court followed this reasoning in holding that employees 
could not demonstrate an imprudent decision simply by showing that U.S. Airways 
continued to offer stock during a shaky season for the company that ultimately led 
to bankruptcy, regardless of the extent of employees’ financial losses.59 Several years 
later in Plasterers, the Fourth Circuit required that “the courts measure section 
1104(a)(1)(B)’s ‘prudence’ requirement according to an objective standard, 
focusing on a fiduciary’s conduct in arriving at an investment decision, not on its 
results, and asking whether a fiduciary employed the appropriate methods to 
investigate and determine the merits of a particular investment.”60 Thus, the Fourth 
 51. DiFelice, 497 F.3d at 418. 
 52. Id. at 420 (quoting Flanigan v. Gen. Elec. Co., 242 F.3d 78, 86 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
 53. See DiFelice, 497 F.3d at 418. 
 54. See id. at 421. 
 55. Plasterers’ Local Union No. 96 Pension Plan v. Pepper, 663 F.3d 210, 216 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 56. DiFelice, 497 F.3d at 424. 
 57. Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Roth v. Sawyer-Cleator Lumber Co., 16 F.3d 915, 917–18 (8th 
Cir.1994)).  
 58. DiFelice, 497 F.3d at 424. 
 59. Id. at 425. 
 60. Plasterers, 663 F.3d at 216 (alteration omitted) (quoting In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 434 
(3d Cir. 1996)). 
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Circuit cemented its method for evaluating procedural prudence, but had yet to 
address the method for evaluating loss resulting from procedural imprudence. 
B.  The Fourth Circuit’s Cognizance of the Loss Causation Issue 
Though the Fourth Circuit gave ample consideration to which actions satisfy the 
duties of procedural prudence when it decided cases like DiFelice, it did not 
recognize causation as part of the equation until the 2011 Plasterers decision.61 In 
Plasterers, the Fourth Circuit identified the “noticeable gap” between finding a 
failure to investigate and/or diversify, and concluding that a trustee is therefore 
“liable in damages for the difference between the Plan’s actual and hypothetical 
investment values.”62 Ruling that “simply finding a failure to investigate or diversify 
does not automatically equate to causation of loss and therefore liability,” the 
Fourth Circuit determined that the lower court in Plasterers failed in not 
considering whether the breaches of fiduciary duty actually caused loss to the plan 
in question.63 
By looking to the statute, the Plasterers Court concluded that loss causation must 
form part of any claim for damages under ERISA.64 Section 1109(a) dictates that “a 
fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, 
or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be personally liable to 
make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach.”65 
The Court emphasized the language of “resulting from each such breach,” as 
evidence that courts must consider whether a breach actually caused any losses 
alleged.66 Affirming that an absence of procedural prudence does not necessarily 
equate to causation of loss, the Plasterers Court agreed with the Eighth Circuit’s 
Roth v. Sawyer-Cleator Lumber Co. ruling that a trustee who makes an investment 
decision without an investigation is “insulated from liability [under § 1109(a)] if a 
hypothetical prudent fiduciary would have made the same decision anyway.”67 
Though Plasterers introduced the standard for evaluating causation which would 
ultimately be at issue in Tatum,68 the Court specifically declined to rule on which 
 61. See Plasterers, 663 F.3d at 215–16 (trustees arguing that the district court wrongly found them liable for 
breach of fiduciary duty because the court failed to determine the trustees had made objectively imprudent 
investments). 
 62. Id. at 217. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. (“Thus, while certain conduct may be a breach of an ERISA fiduciary’s duties under § 1104, that 
fiduciary can only be held liable upon a finding that the breach actually caused a loss to the plan.”). 
 65. 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2012). 
 66. Plasterers, 663 F.3d at 217 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2012)). 
 67. Plasterers, 663 F.3d at 218 (alteration in original) (quoting Roth v. Sawyer-Cleator Lumber Co., 16 F.3d 
915, 919 (8th Cir.1994)). 
 68. Compare Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 761 F.3d 346, 356–57 (4th Cir. 2014) (“When the 
fiduciary’s conduct fails to meet this standard, and the plaintiff has made a prima facie case of loss, we next 
inquire whether the fiduciary’s imprudent conduct caused the loss. For ‘[e]ven if a trustee failed to conduct an 
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party should bear the burden of proving causation.69 Otherwise, in the Brink v. 
DaLesio decision, the Fourth Circuit placed the burden of proof on the violator of a 
fiduciary duty, but not in the specific context of an ERISA suit. 70 This served as the 
Tatum Court’s most relevant precedent on the issue. 
C.  The United States Supreme Court Considers Loss Causation 
Two months prior to the Tatum decision, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in 
Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, in which it held that a fiduciary of an employee 
stock ownership plan (“ESOP”) is governed by the same duty of prudence required 
of all other ERISA fiduciaries.71 In discussing the duty of prudence, the Court came 
close to addressing the issue of loss causation in Tatum, offering some guidance 
applicable to the Fourth Circuit. Though it did not directly address the questions of 
who should bear the burden of persuasion for causation and which standard courts 
should use to evaluate loss causation, the Court did specify that the duty of 
prudence does not require an ERISA fiduciary to predict the future performance of 
a company’s stock when making investment decisions.72 Similar to the Fourth 
Circuit’s ruling in DiFelice, the Court found that a “fiduciary’s ‘fail[ure] to outsmart 
a presumptively efficient market . . . is . . . not a sound basis for imposing 
liability.’”73 
The Court particularly stressed the practical effects of judging the prudence of a 
fiduciary’s decision by the outcome of any particular investment, noting that such a 
fiduciary “finds himself between a rock and a hard place: If he keeps investing and 
the stock goes down he may be sued for acting imprudently in violation of § 
1104(a)(1)(B), but if he stops investing and the stock goes up he may be sued for 
disobeying the plan documents in violation of § 1104(a)(1)(D).”74 Consequently, 
the Court directed that lower courts must consider several factors when interpreting 
an ERISA fiduciary’s duties, including “‘competing congressional purposes, such as 
investigation before making a decision,’ and a loss occurred, the trustee ‘is insulated from liability . . . if a 
hypothetical prudent fiduciary would have made the same decision anyway.’” (quoting Plasterers, 663 F.3d at 
218)), with Tatum, 761 F.3d at 374 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (“Nothing—no combination of phrases, words, 
or syllables—in Plasterers’ amounts to an adoption of a ‘would have’ standard. The quotation the majority 
treats as a holding was used merely to demonstrate that ‘causation of loss is not an axiomatic conclusion that 
flows from a breach’ of a procedural duty.” (quoting Plasterers, 663 F.3d at 218)). 
 69. Plasterers, 663 F.3d at 220 (“We express no opinion as to which approach is appropriate, and leave to 
the district court to consider the parties’ arguments upon remand to determine the method most consistent 
with the relevant statutory provisions.”). 
 70. Brink v. DaLesio, 667 F.2d 420, 426 (4th Cir. 1981), opinion modified and superseded on denial of reh’g, 
81-1085, 1982 WL 913725 (4th Cir. 1982) (“It is generally recognized that one who acts in violation of his 
fiduciary duty bears the burden of showing that he acted fairly and reasonably.”). 
 71. Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459, 2463 (2014). 
 72. Id. at 2471–72 (citing Quan v. Computer Sciences Corp., 623 F.3d 870, 881 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
 73. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. at 2472 (alteration in original) (quoting White v. Marshall & Ilsley Corp., 714 
F.3d 980, 992 (7th Cir. 2013)). 
 74. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. at 2470. 
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Congress’ desire to offer employees enhanced protection for their benefits, on the 
one hand, and, on the other, its desire not to create a system that is so complex that 
administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from 
offering welfare benefit plans.’”75 While the Dudenhoeffer Court rejected the 
argument that fiduciaries should thus enjoy a presumption of prudence, it 
simultaneously rejected the notion that mere loss to an investment account 
indicates imprudence on the part of account fiduciaries.76 
D.  The Circuit Split over Assigning the Burden of Proving Loss Causation 
In Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, the Supreme Court affirmed that, where the 
statute governing a particular question is silent, it is the “ordinary default rule that 
plaintiffs bear the risk of failing to prove their claims.”77 The Court further 
explained that it specifically applied the burden to the plaintiff in securities fraud 
cases, equal protection cases, and First Amendment case, among others.78  Yet, the 
Court also noted that it had shifted the burden partially or entirely to the defendant 
in other cases.79 However, ERISA litigation has not fallen into either category. 
Lack of specific precedent from the highest court has resulted in varying rules 
among the circuit courts of appeals. The Fifth Circuit uses a three-step process in 
any suit for breach of ERISA duties, and in the final step, the “‘burden of persuasion 
shifts to the fiduciary to prove that the loss was not caused by . . . the breach of 
duty.’”80 In cases where a breach of fiduciary duty has been demonstrated, the 
Second and Sixth Circuits have shifted the burden to the defendant to prove that 
the breach did not cause loss.81 On the other hand, the Second Circuit left the 
burden of proof on the plaintiff to show that loss resulted from an account 
manager’s failure to make “reasonable efforts to remedy the trustees’ breach” where 
the trustee allegedly embezzled funds,82 and the Eleventh Circuit placed the burden 
of proof as to causation on the plaintiff where a primary fiduciary either 
participated in or failed to cure a breach of duty by a delegated fiduciary.83 In Tatum 
then, the Fourth Circuit had no clear, consistent precedent from its sister circuits 
 75. Id. (citing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996)). 
 76. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. at 2470–71. 
 77. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005). 
 78. See id. at 57. 
 79. See id. (citing FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 44–45 (1948) (placing burden of proof on a 
defendant seeking the benefit of a statutory exception); Alaska Dept. of Environmental Conservation v. EPA, 
540 U.S. 461, 494 (2004) (assigning burdens of production and persuasion entirely to defendant where a 
plaintiff sued to challenge a federal agency’s order)).  
 80. McDonald v. Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co., 60 F.3d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Roth v. Sawyer-
Cleator Lumber Co., 16 F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir. 1994)). 
 81. See N.Y. State Teamsters Council Health & Hosp. Fund v. Estate of DePerno, 18 F.3d 179, 183 (2d Cir. 
1994); Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Gilley, 290 F.3d 827, 830 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 82. See Silverman v. Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co., 138 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 83. See Willett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 953 F.2d 1335, 1341, 1343 (11th Cir. 1992). 
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about how to determine whether the defendant fiduciary caused plan losses, 
requiring it to look to general trust law for guidance.84 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Committee, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the District Court’s holding that RJR breached its duty of procedural 
prudence, but vacated the judgment in favor of RJR and remanded the case after 
finding the District Court used the wrong standard to evaluate whether RJR’s 
imprudent behavior caused loss to the Plan.85 To reach this decision, the Fourth 
Circuit resolved two issues in Tatum’s favor: first, “whether the fiduciary engaged in 
a reasoned decision[-]making process, consistent with that of a prudent man acting 
in [a] like capacity,”86 and, second, “whether the fiduciary’s imprudent conduct 
caused the loss.”87 Tatum had argued on appeal that the District Court used the 
wrong standard to find that RJR’s breach of its duty of procedural prudence had not 
caused the loss.88 RJR contended this point, and raised another issue by challenging 
the District Court’s holding that the breaching fiduciary bears the burden of 
proving that its breach did not cause plan losses.89 
The Fourth Circuit first considered the District Court’s finding that RJR 
breached its duty of procedural prudence to plan participants.90 Noting the 
extensive factual findings supporting the lower court’s holding, the Fourth Circuit 
affirmed a breach had occurred.91 In support, it noted the March 1999 working 
group’s decision to remove the funds after failing to conduct any research or 
investigation into alternatives that might minimize the potential immediate loss to 
participants.92 Similarly, the Court affirmed the District Court’s condemnation of 
RJR’s lack of research in setting the arbitrary six month timeline, thereby causing 
divestment of Nabisco stocks at their lowest value, even though the entire purpose 
of the spin-off was to “allow the Nabisco stock a chance to recover from the tobacco 
taint.”93 RJR’s failure to conduct sufficient investigation was again highlighted by 
the October 1999 meeting, in which RJR executives focused solely on potential 
 84. See Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 761 F.3d 346, 363 (4th Cir. 2014) (“In sum, the long-
recognized trust law principle—that once a fiduciary is shown to have breached his fiduciary duty and a loss is 
established, he bears the burden of proof on loss causation—applies here.”). 
 85. Id. at 368, 372. 
 86. Id. at 356 (alteration in original). 
 87. Id. at 357. 
 88. Id. (“[Tatum] contends that the court incorrectly considered whether a reasonable fiduciary, after 
conducting a proper investigation, could have sold the Nabisco Funds at the same time and in the same manner, 
as opposed to whether a reasonable fiduciary would have done so.”). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See id. at 358, 361. 
 92. Id. at 358. 
 93. Id. at 359. 
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liability without exploring alternatives to the divestment timeline or seeking outside 
counsel to analyze the merits of the divestment schedule.94 Finally, the Circuit Court 
found that RJR should not have considered its potential liability to plan participants 
as a factor in deciding to divest the funds.95 
The Fourth Circuit categorically rejected RJR’s contention that it did not breach 
its duty, citing RJR’s failure to “present evidence of ‘any process by which 
fiduciaries investigated, analyzed, or considered the circumstances regarding the 
Nabisco stocks and whether it was appropriate to divest.’”96 RJR’s argument that 
non-employer, single-stock funds are per se imprudent, and therefore require 
divestment, fared no better.97 The Fourth Circuit ruled that no ERISA-governed 
investments are per se prudent or imprudent, but that a totality-of-the-
circumstances inquiry must be employed to assess whether plan fiduciaries 
exercised prudence in making the investment decision.98 Applying that standard, the 
Fourth Circuit asserted that RJR “blink[ed] at reality” in maintaining that it acted 
to protect participants and minimize loss when it set an arbitrary timeline for 
divestment without investigating prevailing circumstances, thereby ensuring 
immediate, permanent losses to plan beneficiaries.99 
The Tatum Court next addressed which party in a breach of fiduciary duty 
action bears the burden of proof as to loss causation.100 The Fourth Circuit noted its 
previous finding in Plasterers v. Pepper that such a breach does not “automatically 
equate to causation of loss and therefore liability,”101 but also recognized that 
imprudent conduct will usually result in such a loss.102 However, the Plasterers 
Court did not need to decide which party bore the burden of proof as to causation, 
making this an issue of first impression for the Fourth Circuit in the context of 
ERISA litigation.103 
The Tatum Court began its analysis by recognizing the default rule that burden 
of proof rests with the plaintiff when a statute is silent.104 To affirm the District 
Court’s placement of the burden on RJR, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the law of 
trusts provides an exception to the default rule: “[W]hen a beneficiary has 
succeeded in proving that the trustee has committed a breach of trust and that a 
related loss has occurred, the burden shifts to the trustee to prove that the loss 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 360. 
 96. Id. (quoting Tatum v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 926 F. Supp. 2d 648, 681 (M.D.N.C. 2013). 
 97. See Tatum, 761 F.3d at 360. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 361. 
 100. See id. 
 101. Id. (quoting Plasterers’ Local Union No. 96 Pension Plan v. Pepper, 663 F.3d 210, 217 (4th Cir. 2011)). 
 102. Tatum, 761 F.3d at 361 (citing Plasterers, 663 F.3d at 218). 
 103. See Tatum, 761 F.3d at 361. 
 104. Id. at 362. 
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would have occurred in the absence of the breach.”105 The Fourth Circuit found 
analogous support in its Brink v. DaLesio decision, where a district court mistakenly 
assigned to the plaintiff the burden of attributing damages to the defendant 
fiduciary’s breach in a Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act case.106 
The Court also cited amicus Secretary of Labor’s argument that any other approach 
would unfairly advantage a defendant “who has already been shown to have 
engaged in wrongful conduct, minimizing the fiduciary provisions’ deterrent 
effect.”107 
For a defendant to carry the burden of proving that its imprudent decision-
making process did not cause loss, the Tatum Court ruled that the defendant must 
show that its ultimate decision was objectively prudent—meaning, the defendant 
must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a “hypothetical prudent 
fiduciary would have made the same decision anyway.”108 In other words, the Court 
found the “inquiry is whether the loss would have occurred regardless of the 
fiduciary’s imprudence.”109 By such a showing, a fiduciary like RJR may escape 
liability even though it failed to conduct a proper investigation before making an 
investment decision.110 
Based on this rule, the Tatum Court found that the District Court had used the 
wrong standard when it required RJR to prove that a “hypothetical prudent 
fiduciary could have decided to eliminate the Nabisco Funds,”111 and ultimately held 
that a prudent investor could have inferred the sale was prudent because “evidence 
did not ‘compel a decision to maintain the Nabisco Funds in the Plan.’”112 Instead, 
the District Court should have considered whether the evidence proved, more likely 
than not, that a prudent fiduciary would have divested the Nabisco Funds in the 
same time period and manner as RJR.113 Citing the Supreme Court, the Fourth 
Circuit found the distinction in language critical because “‘could’ describes what is 
merely possible, while ‘would’ describes what is probable.”114 While use of “would” 
involves prediction based on custom or common occurrence, the word “could” 
encompasses the most remote possibilities.”115 
RJR argued that even under the “would have” standard, it should escape liability 
because a prudent fiduciary would have eliminated the Nabisco Funds from the 
 105. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 100 cmt. f (2012)). 
 106. Tatum, 761 F.3d at 362–63. 
 107. Id. at 363. 
 108. Id. at 363–64. 
 109. Id. at 366. 
 110. Id. at 364. 
 111. Id. (quoting Tatum v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 926 F. Supp. 2d 648, 690 (M.D.N.C. 2013)). 
 112. Tatum, 761 F.3d at 364 (quoting Tatum, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 686). 
 113. See Tatum, 761 F.3d at 364. 
 114. Id. at 365 (citing Knight v. Comm’r, 552 U.S. 181, 187–88 (2008)). 
 115. Tatum, 761 F.3d at 365. 
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plan due to their high-risk nature, thereby making application of the District 
Court’s “could have” standard harmless.116 Rejecting this argument, the Tatum 
Court found the risk of an investment insufficient to label it per se prudent or 
imprudent.117 Instead, a court must consider the “character and aim of the 
particular plan and decision at issue and the circumstances prevailing at the time.”118 
Under that standard, the Fourth Circuit found that RJR’s failure to follow 
governing plan documents, as mandated by ERISA, would be more compelling in 
determining causation than the high-risk nature of the funds.119 Thus, the District 
Court’s application of the “could have” standard was not harmless, and the Fourth 
Circuit remanded the case to the District Court to determine whether RJR could 
present additional evidence to meet its burden of proof as to causation under the 
“would have” standard.120 
In the lone dissenting opinion, Judge Wilkinson disagreed with the majority 
ruling on both issues: assigning burden of proof as to loss causation and the 
standard by which to assess loss causation.121 First, Judge Wilkinson argued that, in 
Plasterers, the Fourth Circuit had already “noted that ‘simply finding a failure to 
investigate or diversify does not automatically equate to causation of loss and 
therefore liability.’”122 Further, he noted the Plasterers rule’s conformity to ERISA 
itself, which requires that “the losses ‘result from’ the breach of fiduciary duty.”123 
This and other language in ERISA, Judge Wilkinson argued, provides no indication 
that Congress intended to shift the burden of proof for loss causation to potential 
defendants.124 Finally, he contended that the precedent relied upon by the majority 
to shift the burden could be distinguished as either cases of self-dealing or cases 
focusing on a different step of ERISA litigation, such as the extent of liability rather 
than the existence of loss causation.125 
Second, Judge Wilkinson disagreed with the majority’s decision to assess loss 
causation from ERISA investment decisions through the lens of what a reasonably 
prudent investor would have done.126 He contended that the definition of the 
“would have” standard—whether or not a reasonably prudent fiduciary would, 
more likely than not, have made the safe decision127—inherently shifts the evaluative 
 116. Id. at 366. 
 117. Id. at 366–67. 
 118. Id. at 367 (quoting DiFelice v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d 410, 420 (4th Cir. 2007)). 
 119. See Tatum, 761 F.3d at 367. 
 120. Id. at 368. 
 121. See id. at 372–73 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
 122. Id. at 374 (quoting Plasterers’ Local Union No. 96 Pension Plan v. Pepper, 663 F.3d 210, 217 (4th Cir. 
2011)). 
 123. Tatum, 761 F.3d at 375 (alteration omitted) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2012)). 
 124. Tatum, 761 F.3d at 375. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 377. 
 127. Id. 
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standard from objective prudence to relative prudence.128 Judge Wilkinson assessed 
that such a standard unfairly requires a fiduciary to always make the “best possible 
decision,”129 when meeting such a strict standard is not required by ERISA and 
when investing is “as much art as science” because there are always many 
investment options with many unknowable outcomes.130 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
RJR appealed the Fourth Circuit’s decision to the United States Supreme Court, but 
the Supreme Court denied certiorari on June 29, 2015.131 Because there is no 
indication that RJR refiled its petition, the Fourth Circuit’s rulings in Tatum remain 
untouched, though future litigation may well threaten their longevity. This 
prediction rests on two observations: first, that requiring a defendant fiduciary to 
bear the burden of proof as to loss causation does not comport with the 
congressional intent of ERISA, as evidenced in the plain language of that statute; 
and, second, that the “would have” standard for assessing causation does not align 
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Dudenhoeffer. 
A.  The Fourth Circuit’s Burden Shifting Framework Regarding Loss Causation does 
not Comport with ERISA 
Due to the circuit split over which party bears the burden of proof as to loss 
causation in ERISA litigation, a future Supreme Court decision on the issue would 
have wider impact than solely affirming or overruling the Tatum case.132 Should the 
issue ever come before the Supreme Court, that Court will likely overrule Tatum 
because, based on both the Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit’s default rules for 
assigning burden of proof regarding loss causation to plaintiffs,133 and the statutory 
language of ERISA in 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a),134 the Tatum Court should not have ruled 
that this burden of proof rests with the defendant fiduciary. 
 128. Id. at 378. 
 129. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 130. Id. at 377–78. 
 131. See RJR Pension Inv. Comm. v. Tatum, 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015) (mem.). 
 132. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text. 
 133. See Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56–57 (2005); Weast v. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer, 377 
F.3d 449, 452 (4th Cir. 2004), aff’d, Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (“When a statute is 
silent, the burden of proof is normally allocated to the party initiating the proceeding and seeking relief.”).  
 134. See 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2012) (“(a) Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches 
any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be personally 
liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such 
plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and 
shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal 
of such fiduciary.”). 
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As the Tatum Court recognized,135 the default rule is that “plaintiffs bear the 
burden of persuasion regarding the essential aspects of their claims,” and therefore 
“bear the risk of failing to prove their claims.”136 Though the Supreme Court noted 
the “ordinary default rule, of course, admits of exceptions,”137 the Tatum Court 
erred when it found that the law of trusts provides one such exception for claims of 
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA.138 The Supreme Court found that the 
exceptions are “extremely rare,” and that the general default rule will be applied 
absent a “reason to believe that Congress intended otherwise.”139 The Fourth Circuit 
provided no justification as to why Congress would intend the Tatum rule, cited 
from the Restatement (Third) of Trusts,140 to provide an exception in this type of 
case.141 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s recognition that “ERISA’s standards and 
procedural protections partly reflect a congressional determination that the 
common law of trusts did not offer completely satisfactory protection,”142 meant 
that the Tatum Court could not blindly assume, as it did, that the Restatement of 
Trusts should govern. 
Looking to the language of 29 U.S.C. § 1109, which establishes the claim for 
liability, there is nothing to suggest that Congress intended for the defendant to 
bear the burden of proof as to causation. While the prerequisite of any § 1109 claim 
is breach of the “responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by 
this subchapter,” there is only liability for “losses to the plan resulting from each 
such breach.”143 Shifting the burden of causation to the defendant, therefore, not 
only violates the default rule that a plaintiff bear the burden of proving essential 
aspects of its claim,144 but exempts the plaintiff from having to prove the only 
requirement for liability under the statute. 
The Tatum rule, then, goes further than the Plasterers observation that 
“imprudent conduct will usually result in a loss.”145 The Tatum Court’s rule as to the 
burden of proving loss causation grants a default victory to any plaintiff that can 
show imprudent conduct by a fiduciary, regardless of whether there is an 
 135. See Tatum, 761 F.3d at 362 (majority opinion) (“Generally, of course, when a statute is silent, the 
default rule provides that the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff.”). 
 136. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 56–57. 
 137. Id. at 57. 
 138. Tatum, 761 F.3d at 362. 
 139. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 57. 
 140. See Tatum, 761 F.3d at 362 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 100 cmt. f (2012) (“[W]hen a 
beneficiary has succeeded in proving that the trustee has committed a breach of trust and that a related loss has 
occurred, the burden shifts to the trustee to prove that the loss would have occurred in the absence of the 
breach.”)). 
 141. See Tatum, 761 F.3d at 362 (claiming only that “one such exception arises under the common law of 
trusts”). 
 142. Id. at 357 (quoting Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996)). 
 143. 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 144. See Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 56–57. 
 145. Plasterers’ Local Union No. 96 Pension Plan v. Pepper, 663 F.3d 210, 218 (4th Cir. 2011). 
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accompanying harm. As the dissent argued, default monetary liability does not 
comport with the statute’s separate offering of “other equitable or remedial relief, 
including removal of such fiduciary,”146 which is predicated solely on showing a 
breach of “responsibilities, obligations, or duties.”147 Causation of loss is the 
essential element of a claim for damages under § 1109.148 The Court should not have 
assigned the burden of proof to the defendant—essentially giving default damages 
to the plaintiff—absent compelling Congressional justification. 
Practically, this rule makes the Fourth Circuit more plaintiff-friendly in suits for 
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA. Per Tatum, the Fourth Circuit requires 
nothing more from plaintiffs than showing imprudent decision-making processes 
on the part of a defendant and a prima facie showing of loss.149 Alternatively, the 
legal landscape has become more difficult for ERISA fiduciaries in the Fourth 
Circuit who now face monetary liability if they cannot disprove that their decisions 
caused losses to the plan.150 The dissent noted the likely increase in the amount of 
ERISA claims in the Fourth Circuit, due to the relaxed burden of proof on 
plaintiffs.151 Compounded by the loss causation standard adopted by the Fourth 
Circuit, this rule will require ERISA fiduciaries seeking to avoid costly settlements 
or judgments to exercise extreme caution in making plan decisions, likely inhibiting 
fiduciary willingness to make some investment decisions actually beneficial to plan 
participants.152 Such circumstances create an imbalance of what the Supreme Court 
recognized as the “competing congressional purposes” of ERISA; namely, 
“Congress’ desire to offer employees enhanced protection for their benefits, on the 
one hand, and, on the other, its desire not to create a system that is so complex that 
administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from 
offering welfare benefit plans in the first place.”153 Thus, should the Supreme Court 
ever find that the Fourth Circuit’s burden of proof assignment disproportionately 
increases legal and administrative costs for plan fiduciaries, it will have even more 
reason to overturn the Tatum rule. 
 146. See Tatum, 761 F.3d at 376 (alteration omitted) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1109). 
 147. 29 U.S.C. § 1109. 
 148. See 29 U.S.C. § 1109. 
 149. See Tatum, 761 F.3d at 363 (majority opinion). 
 150. See id. 
 151. See id. at 381 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority’s approach will wreak havoc . . . , 
encouraging opportunistic litigation to challenge even the most sensible financial decisions.”). 
 152. See id. at 383 (“[F]ar from safeguarding the assets of ERISA-plan participants, the litigation spawned by 
the majority will simply drive up plan-administration and insurance costs. It will discourage plan fiduciaries 
from fully diversifying plan assets. It will contribute to a climate of second-guessing prudent decisions at the 
point of market shift. It will disserve those whom ERISA was intended to serve when fiduciaries are hauled into 
court for seeking, sensibly, to safeguard retirement savings.”). 
 153. Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459, 2470 (2014) (citing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 
U.S. 489, 497 (1996)). 
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B.  The Supreme Court’s Decision in Dudenhoeffer Indicates Disagreement with the 
“Would Have” Standard for Evaluating Loss Causation 
In Dudenhoeffer, the Supreme Court did not specifically address the standard for 
evaluating loss causation in cases of procedural imprudence when it concluded that 
the law does not create a special presumption of prudence for ESOP fiduciaries.154 
However, the Court’s reasoning in Dudenhoeffer suggests it would likely overrule 
the “would have” standard of the Tatum decision if the issue is ever brought before 
the Court.155 Not only would this reverse the Fourth Circuit standard, but it would 
provide guidance to lower courts on an issue that currently lacks clear precedent.156 
In Dudenhoeffer, the respondent based its claim on a reasoning of causation 
similar to the “would have” standard adopted by the Tatum Court.157 The 
respondent argued that the petitioner’s decision to allow “investment in Fifth Third 
Stock even during the time that the stock price was declining in value as a result of 
the collapse of the housing market” was imprudent because “a prudent fiduciary 
facing similar circumstances would not have stood idly by as the Plan’s assets were 
decimated.”158 The Court found this appeal to a “would have” standard of causation 
did not comport with an objective reliance on market prices, where ERISA 
fiduciaries, or any other investors who can “reasonably see ‘little hope of 
outperforming the market . . . based solely on their analysis of publicly available 
information,’ may, as a general matter, likewise prudently rely on the market 
price.”159 Where a stock is publicly traded, like the various Nabisco stocks at issue in 
Tatum,160 the Supreme Court found that “allegations that a fiduciary should have 
recognized from publicly available information alone that the market was over- or 
undervaluing the stock are implausible as a general rule, at least in the absence of 
special circumstance.”161 
The Fourth Circuit found RJR fiduciaries liable for causing plan losses by 
divesting the Nabisco stocks without showing that, more likely than not, a prudent 
fiduciary would have done the same.162 While the RJR fiduciaries may not have 
exercised procedural prudence,163 their decision to divest was certainly founded on 
publicly available information about the market price of the stocks.164 Noting the 
 154. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. at 2471. 
 155. See id. 
 156. See supra Part II. 
 157. See Tatum, 761 F.3d at 364 (majority opinion). 
 158. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. at 2471. 
 159. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. 
Ct. 1184, 1192 (2013)). 
 160. Tatum v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 926 F. Supp. 2d 648, 665 (M.D.N.C. 2013). 
 161. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. at 2471. 
 162. Tatum, 761 F.3d at 364. 
 163. See id. at 358. 
 164. See Tatum, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 666. 
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low price of the Nabisco stocks, RJR fiduciaries worried that they would never 
rebound.165 RJR chose to divest the Nabisco funds because the value of the stocks 
was still falling,166 essentially relying on what the Dudenhoeffer Court described as 
the “security’s market price as an unbiased assessment of the security’s value in light 
of all public information.”167 In other words, RJR relied on publicly available market 
information to make the divestment decision, meaning that the Supreme Court 
would find Tatum’s claim “implausible as a general rule, at least in the absence of 
special circumstances”168—an exception the Court did not develop further.169 
In terms of the “could have” versus “would have” debate, the Supreme Court’s 
objective test of reliance on market pricing suggests the Court is far more in-line 
with a “could have” standard for evaluating loss causation. If “a fiduciary usually ‘is 
not imprudent to assume that a major stock market . . . provides the best estimate 
of the value of the stocks traded on it that is available to him,’” then the only 
imprudent investment decision is one based on something other than market 
pricing.170 Thus, the emphasis is not on the decision reached, but on the means of 
reaching the decision. This takes into account the variety of investment options 
different security fiduciaries could make based on the same information, as 
evidenced by the Fourth Circuit’s observation that analysts were generally divided 
as to whether Nabisco stock would continue to fall, hold constant, or eventually 
gain.171 Consequently, if the burden is on RJR to show that its procedural 
imprudence did not cause loss, RJR would need to show that a procedurally 
prudent fiduciary could reach the same decision on the same publicly available 
market information. Alternatively, if the burden rests on Tatum to show that RJR’s 
procedural imprudence caused plan loss, Tatum would need to show that a 
procedurally prudent fiduciary could not reach the same decision from the same 
publicly available market information. As the dissent in Tatum noted, the Fourth 
Circuit “seeks to shift the standard of objective prudence to one of relative 
prudence.”172 
 165. Id. at 662. 
 166. Id. at 661. 
 167. Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459, 2471 (2014) (quoting Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. 
John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2411 (2014)). 
 168. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. at 2471. 
 169. Id. at 2472 (“We do not here consider whether a plaintiff could nonetheless plausibly allege 
imprudence on the basis of publicly available information by pointing to a special circumstance affecting the 
reliability of the market price as ‘an unbiased assessment of the security’s value in light of all public 
information,’ that would make reliance on the market’s valuation imprudent.” (quoting Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. 
at 2411)). 
 170. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. at 2471–72 (quoting Summers v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 453 F.3d 404, 
408 (7th Cir. 2006)). 
 171. See Tatum, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 662–63. 
 172. Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 761 F.3d 346, 378 (4th Cir. 2014) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
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The Dudenhoeffer Court further supported the preeminence of relying on 
publicly available market information when it rejected any requirement for 
fiduciaries to use insider information.173 Thus, any inside knowledge about pending 
competitive bidding or the unsolicited offer to purchase the company, regardless of 
the positive effect either might have on the Nabisco stock, would be irrelevant in 
assessing RJR’s liability.174 So, based on Dudenhoeffer, to justify divestment, RJR only 
needed to look at the consistent devaluing of the Nabisco stock, and the fact that 
others analyzing the market could conclude that the stock might fall further.175 
The Supreme Court would also likely overrule the Fourth Circuit’s “would have” 
standard due to inconsistency with the ERISA statute. In espousing a “would have” 
standard for assessing causation, the Fourth Circuit mischaracterizes the “could 
have” standard as providing little protection to plan participants by justifying a 
fiduciary’s decision upon showing that at least one other fiduciary could arrive at 
the same decision.176 ERISA requires fiduciaries to act “with the care, skill, prudence, 
and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in 
a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an 
enterprise of a like character and with like aims.”177 As the Tatum dissent noted, the 
District Court’s “could have” standard “would not be satisfied merely by imagining 
any single hypothetical fiduciary that might have come to the same decision.  
Rather, it asks whether hypothetical prudent fiduciaries consider the path chosen to 
have been a reasonable one.”178 Therefore, the Supreme Court is likely to eventually 
reject the “would have” standard per its reasoning in Dudenhoeffer, without 
contradicting ERISA’s stated purpose to protect beneficiaries by “assuring the 
equitable character of [employee benefit plans] and their financial soundness.”179 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Circuit’s Tatum decision could have served as a catalyst for the Supreme 
Court to not only correct bad case law, but to resolve a circuit split and provide 
needed guidance on rules that significantly impact ERISA’s application to litigation 
over alleged instances of procedural imprudence. The Fourth Circuit’s decision to 
depart from the default rule and assign burden of proof regarding loss causation to 
the defendant instead of the plaintiff does not align with the substance of the ERISA 
statute, nor with the typical assignment of that burden in both Supreme Court and 
 173. See Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. at 2472. 
 174. See Tatum, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 666. 
 175. See id. (noting that since the spin-off of the preceding June, NGH had fallen 60 percent and NA had 
fallen 28 percent). 
 176. Tatum, 761 F.3d at 365 (majority opinion). 
 177. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2012). 
 178. Tatum, 761 F.3d at 377 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
 179. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2012). 
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Fourth Circuit precedent.180 Furthermore, the Tatum Court’s adoption of a “would 
have” standard for evaluating whether procedural imprudence caused loss to a 
retirement plan does not fit with the Supreme Court’s objective, market price-based 
analysis in Dudenhoeffer.181 Consequently, interested parties could justifiably expect 
the Supreme Court to overrule the Fourth Circuit on both points should the issues 
ever reach the Supreme Court in a future case. 
 
 180. See supra Part IV.A. 
 181. See supra Part IV.B. 
